Detalles del Título
Detalles del Título

< Ant.
Sig. >
 
Título Economic origins of dictatorship and democracyLibros / Impreso - Libros
Autor(es) Acemoglu, Daron (Autor)
Robinson, James A. (Autor)
Publicación Cambridge, Massachusetts ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2006
Descripción Física xv, 416 páginas : ilustraciones ; 24 cm.
Idioma Inglés;
ISBN 0521855268
Clasificación(es) 321.8
ECONOMIA
Materia(s) Democracia; Aspectos económicos; Democratización; Igualdad; Cultura política; Dictadura; Gobierno comparado;
Nota(s) CONTENIDO: Questions and Answers. Paths of Political Development. Britain. Argentina. Singapore. South Africa. The Agenda. Our Argument. Democracy vs. Nondemocracy. Building Blocks of Our Approach. Towards Our Basic Story. Our Theory of Democratization. Democratic Consolidation. Determinants of Democracy. Political Identities and the Nature of Conict. Democracy in a Picture. Overview of the Book. What Do We Know About Democracy?. Measuring Democracy. Patterns of Democracy. Democracy, Inequality and Redistribution. Crises and Democracy. Social Unrest and Democratization. The Literature. Our Contribution. Modelling Politics. Democratic Politics. Introduction. Aggregating Individual Preferences. Single-Peaked Preferences and the Median Voter Theorem. Our Workhorse Models. Democracy and Political Equality. Conclusion. Nondemocratic Politics. Introduction. Power and Constraints in Nondemocratic Politics. Modeling Preferences and Constraints in Nondemocracies. Commitment Problems. A Simple Game of Promises. A Dynamic Model. Incentive Compatible Promises. Conclusion. The Creation and Consolidation of Democracy. Democratization. Introduction. The Role of Political Institutions. Preferences over Political Institutions. Political Power and Institutions. A 'Static' Model of Democratization. Democratization or Repression?. A Dynamic Model of Democratization. Subgame Perfect Equilibria. Alternative Political Identities. Targeted Transfers. Power of the Elite in Democracy. Ideological Preferences over Regimes. Democratization in Pictures. Equilibrium Revolutions. Conclusion. Coups and Consolidation. Introduction. Incentives for Coups. A Static Model of Coups. A Dynamic Model of the Creation and Consolidation of Democracy. Alternative Political Identities. Targeted Transfers. Power in Democracy and Coups. Consolidation in a Picture. Defensive Coups. Conclusion
continuación del CONTENIDO: Putting the Models to Work. The Role of the Middle Class. Introduction. The Three-Class Model. Emergence of Partial Democracy. From Partial to Full Democracy. Repression: The Middle Class As A Bu_er. Repression: Soft-liners vs. Hard-liners. The Role of the Middle Class in Consolidating Democracy. Conclusion. Economic Structure and Democracy. Introduction. Economic Structure and Income Distribution. Political Conict. Capital, Land and the Transition to Democracy. Costs of Coup on Capital and Land. Capital, Land and the Burden of Democracy. Conict Between Landowners and Industrialists. Industrialists, Landowners and Democracy in Practice. Economic Institutions. Human Capital. Conjectures about Political Development. Conclusions. Globalization and Democracy. Introduction. A Model of an Open Economy. Political Conict|Democratic Consolidation. Political Conict|Transition to Democracy. Financial Integration. Increased Political Integration. Alternative Assumptions about the Nature of International Trade. Conclusions. Conclusions and The Future of Democracy. Conclusions and the Future of Democracy. Paths of Political Development Revisited. Extensions and Areas for Future Research. The Future of Democracy. Appendix. Appendix to Chapter 4: The Distribution of Power in Democracy. Introduction. Probabilistic Voting Models. Lobbying. Partisan Politics and Political Capture.
Ver en WorldCat WorldCat
Ver en Google Books Google Books
Disponibilidad
CodBarras Localización Piso Signatura Estado Categoría
069429Biblioteca Universidad Icesi3321.8/A173eDisponibleCol. General