Detalles del Título
Detalles del Título

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Título Dynamics in action: intentional behavior as a complex systemLibros / Impreso - Libros
Autor(es) Juarrero, Alicia (Autor)
Publicación Massachusetts : Massachusetts Institute of Technology, MIT, ©1999
Descripción Física x, 288 páginas
Idioma Inglés;
ISBN 0262600471
Clasificación(es) 155.25
Materia(s) PSICOLOGIA DEL DESARROLLO. INFANCIA Y NIÑEZ (02466); PSICOLOGIA DEL DESARROLLO. ADOLESCENCIA Y ADULTEZ (02470); Psicología del desarrollo; Desarrollo cognitivo; Teoría de sistemas dinámicos; Comportamiento autónomo; Redes neuronales; THELEN, ESTHER; Acto (Filosofía); Teoría de la acción; Psicología cognitiva;
Nota(s) CONTENIDO: Acknowledgments.-- Abbreviations.-- Introduction.-- Why Action Theory Rests on a Mistake.-- How the Modern Understanding of Cause Came to Be.-- Causal Theories of Action.-- Action and the Modern Understanding of Explanation.-- Action as Lawful Regularities.-- Action and Reductive Accounts of Purposiveness.-- Information Theory and the Problem of Action.-- Dynamical Systems Theory and Human Action.-- Some New Vocabulary: A Primer on Systems Theory.-- Nonequilibrium Thermodynamics.-- Constraints as Causes: The Intersection of Information Theory and Complex Systems Dynamics.-- Dynamical Constraints as Landscapes: Meaning and Behavior as Topology.-- Embodied Meaning.-- Intentional Action: A Dynamical Account.--Threading an Agent's Control Loop through the Environment.-- Explaining Human Action: Why Dynamics Tells Us That Stories Are Necessary.-- Narrative Explanation and the Dynamics of Action.-- Agency, Freedom, and Individuality.-- Notes.-- References.-- Index .-
RESUMEN: "Alicia Juarrero argues that a mistaken, 350-year-old model of cause and explanation - one that takes all causes to be of the push-pull, efficient cause sort, and all explanations to be prooflike - underlies contemporary theories of action. Juarrero then proposes a new framework for conceptualizing causes based on complex adaptive systems. Thinking of causes as dynamical constraints makes bottom-up and top-down causal relations, including those involving intentional causes, suddenly tractable. A different logic for explaining actions - as historical narrative, not inference - follows if one adopts this novel approach to long-standing questions of action and responsibility."--BOOK JACKET.
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CodBarras Localización Piso Signatura Estado Categoría
076315Biblioteca Universidad Icesi3155.25/J91DisponibleCol. General